This paper constructs a measure of niche reputation arising from the comparative advantages of different types of underwriters. The relation between niche reputation and fees is used to gauge the impact of commercial bank entry on the market structure of bond underwriting. During 1991-1996, incumbent investment banks charged higher fees for their niche reputation, which suggests an oligopolistic market structure. During 1997-2000, such rents were competed away as bank entry became prominent. As entrants, commercial banks always charge lower fees for their niche reputation -better services and lower fees to attract new customers -which indicates that bond underwriting market was difficult to penetrate. Besides, both types of underwriters selectively, rather than universally, reduced fees in the industries where competition was stronger and imminent.
1.

Introduction
Underwriting fees are the rents for maintaining reputations, which are a major source of revenues for securities firms. Underwriters' incentives to do due diligence are linked to their abilities to charge fees on their services at present and in the future. Information asymmetry and costly information production give financial intermediaries a role to exist. However, information produced by investment banks is also nonexcludable. To resolve the information free riding problem and provide underwriters enough rents to produce information, Anand and Galetovic (2000) contend that an oligopolistic structure is necessary for the market to exist. Neither a perfectly competitive market nor a monopoly can be sustained. A competitive market does not provide enough rents and the information free riding problem reduces the incentives to produce information. On the other hand, monopoly rents invite entry. This theoretical exposition implies that the bond underwriting market is oligopolistic and underwriters can charge higher fees above the regular production costs. I test this proposition as the oligopolistic market hypothesis.
1
Examining whether the bond underwriting market is oligopolistic or competitive is not merely an exercise to satisfy academic curiosity. Due to regulatory changes, commercial banks have been permitted to underwrite corporate bonds since 1989. Bank entry may dramatically alter the market structure of the securities industry. This paper analyzes the impact of commercial bank entry on bond underwriting fees to gauge the changing industrial organization of the bond underwriting market in the 1990s. This topic is timely and important because if bank entry competition is too intense, the reduction in fees may not provide underwriters enough incentives to do proper due diligence. In this case, regulatory changes may unintentionally encourage underwriters to engage in short sighted behavior and to forego the long term well being of the system because of an immediate threat to their survival.
Evidence on investment bankers' questionable practices is starting to accumulate, for example, Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003) document that underwriters appeared to use more aggressive analyst recommendations to win underwriting mandates in the bond market during the late 1990s. Ten major underwriters agreed to settle with securities regulators in 2002 and paid more than $1.4 billion in fines for their analyst recommendation problems. 2 In one of the largest class action lawsuit settlements, Citigroup Inc. agreed to pay $2.65 billion to settle a suit brought by WorldCom investors. The lawsuit alleges that Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and others didn't conduct adequate due diligence before bringing WorldCom bonds to the market.
3 Song (2004) documents that bond issuing clients in the high commercial bank entry industries have a significantly higher probability of being sued for financial reporting fraud. The result is consistent with the claim that competitive pressure due to bank entry reduces underwriting incentives during the Internet bubble period. The immediate question is: what are the underlying economic drivers of this questionable behavior in the bond underwriting market?
In this paper, I investigate the natural candidates, underwriting fees and competition.
Competitive pressure affects underwriters' ability to charge rents for maintaining reputations, which in turn, affects underwriters' incentives to do due diligence. I test a competitive pressure hypothesis that underwriting fees are lower in the industries with higher levels of bank entry.
Constructing a bank entry variable is quite straightforward. I aggregate the number of bonds underwritten by commercial banks on a yearly basis in an industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes). However, the test of the oligopolistic market hypothesis is by no means simple. An 2 See the article "Wall Street's $1.5B reform on precipice of settlement," USA Today, December 20, 2002. 3 "Citigroup Will Pay $2.65 Billion To Settle WorldCom Investor Suit", Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2004, p. A1. oligopolistic structure arising from market imperfection implies segmentation or specialization.
Therefore, there is a role for additional rents with prices above the regular production costs. A proxy is required to measure differentiated underwriting abilities, i.e., niche reputation due to specialization, so we can use the relation between underwriting fees and niche reputation to examine the industrial organization of the bond underwriting market.
The entry of commercial banks not only changed the competitive level of bond underwriting market, but also gave bond issuing clients additional choices of underwriters. The distinct differences between commercial and investment banks provide a convenient way to measure niche reputations. The information advantages and financing flexibility (choice of public debt or bank loans) of commercial banks provided a solid base for bank entry. Whereas, commercial banks' potential for conflicts of interest gave investment banks a role to continue serving a clientele quite different from that of commercial banks. These comparative advantages indicate that commercial banks can obtain higher bond prices (lower net yields -interest costs paid by bond issuers) for some clients than investment banks can, and vice versa (Song (2003a) ).
These net yield differentials provide a measure of niche reputations. Because the bond net yield obtained by unselected underwriter is not observable, this differential is estimated by using a model known as switching regressions with endogenous switching described in Maddala (1983) .
Niche reputation is the incremental interest cost saving an underwriter can achieve for its client relative to that the unselected underwriter type could have obtained. The oligopolistic market hypothesis predicts that an underwriter can share such an incremental benefit with its client. Therefore, underwriting fees and niche reputation are positively correlated. On the other hand, if increased competition due to bank entry drives away incumbents' ability to charge higher fees, then underwriting fees and niche reputation will have no relationship or will be negatively correlated in order to retain customers that investment banks serve well.
Although quantity reputation (market share) has been explored in many empirical studies, this paper focuses on the niche reputation at the individual client level. 4 This paper is different from prior work, such as Gande, Puri and Saunders (1999) , in important ways. Gande et al (1999) study the time-series underwriting fees changes at the overall market level in the 1980s
and early 1990s. The fees reduction over time found in their paper is also consistent with other regulatory changes, technology developments, and increased global competition. However, the approach employed in this paper examines the cross-sectional effect of head-to-head competition between commercial and investment banks at the industry level.
Industrial corporate bonds issued during 1991-2000 are employed to test these two hypotheses. The staircase relaxation in revenue limitations provides an easy way to test the impact of changing competitive pressure on incumbents' pricing scheme. The revenue limitation imposed only on commercial banks was 10 percent prior to 1996. 5 It was raised to 25 percent at the end of 1996, which permits commercial banks to penetrate the bond markets more effectively.
The findings show that, in the early bank entry stage (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) , incumbent investment banks charged higher fees for their niche reputations, but the magnitude was small. During 1997-2000, incumbents can no longer charge higher fees for their niche reputations. It appears that the aggressive expansion of commercial banks resulted in a more effective competitive force on incumbent investment banks during the later period. The shock of bank entry affects the oligopolistic equilibrium and the market becomes more competitive. Regardless of time period, 4 See Livingston and Miller (2000) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) lower their fees strategically based on the intensity of bank competition in specific industries.
The intensified competition in bond underwriting provides a rationale as to why underwriters appear to use more aggressive analyst recommendations to win bond underwriting mandates (Ljungqvist et al (2003) ). The evidence of an aggressive fee schedule and analyst recommendations coupled with the high occurrence of financial scandals in high bank entry industries suggests that increased competition reduces underwriters' incentives to maintain reputation capital in the bond market. The detrimental market crash in 2000 signifies the importance of a study of this sort that tries to enhance knowledge regarding the incentives and behavior of underwriters.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the testable hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 reports the summary statistics. Section 5 examines the pricing of underwriting services. Section 6 concludes.
Testable Hypotheses
Asymmetric information prohibits the direct access of many firms to the capital markets.
In order to raise funds to facilitate corporate operations, firms typically rely on the service of underwriters to certify their security issues. As important information producers in the economy, security underwriters build a reputation by evaluating the quality of their clients and setting prices that are acceptable to both issuing firms and investors. They distribute the issues to the investors and monitor the firms for the investors (see, for example, Leland and Pyle (1977) , Campbell and Kracaw (1980) , Beatty and Ritter (1986), and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) ).
Fees are charged by the underwriters to compensate for these explicit costs of information production and security distribution (Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) ). Although the determinants of underwriting fees have been investigated empirically based on the above-mentioned explicit costs (see also James (1992) and Livingston and Miller (2000) ), the interdependence between the pricing schemes of underwriting services and the dynamic of changing competitive forces in the underwriting market has yet to be examined.
Niche reputation and the oligopolistic market hypothesis
The main differences between commercial and investment bank underwriting stem from the additional lending arm and other traditional banking business commercial banks have. 6 The capacity to both lend and underwrite serves as a double-edged sword on bank clients. On the one hand, the information advantages and financing flexibility may provide better certification for bank clients if banks are also the underwriters (see, for example, Fama (1985) , Diamond (1991), and Hadlock and James (2002) 
I then estimate two separate net yield regressions with the control of endogenous switching for the two types of underwriters to capture their comparative advantages:
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where is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if firm i chooses a commercial bank as its underwriter, and 0 otherwise, is the net yield of the bond for firm i. 
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Given that there is sorting of clients, the proper metric to gauge the difference in commercial and investment bank underwriting for a commercial bank client is then defined by the following difference:
In words, the net yield savings of using commercial bank underwriting is the difference between the actual net yield ( ) that a commercial bank obtains for the firm and the expected conditional mean net yield (
of the same client, had the issue been underwritten by an investment bank. If a commercial bank can achieve a higher bond price (lower net yield) than an investment bank can for the same client, then the net yield saving is positive. Although is unobservable, Maddala (1983) shows that it can be estimated by plugging the firm and issue characteristics of commercial bank clients into equation (3), the investment bank net yield regression. Therefore, equation (4) could be expressed as the following:
There is one remaining problem with this net yield savings measure. It may contribute to an inconsistent estimate in the underwriting fees regression because the actual net yield ( ) may be correlated with fees due to unobserved factors, i.e., there is an endogeneity problem. The detailed explanation of this problem is provided in the Appendix. To solve this problem, I use The relation between underwriting fees and niche reputations due to specializations has not been explored in the prior empirical literature. If the market is oligopolistic, then such incremental net yield savings arising from differentiated underwriting ability can be shared between clients and underwriters. This suggests that underwriting fees should be positively related to net yield savings (niche reputation). I test this as the oligopolistic market hypothesis.
Competitive pressure hypothesis
If, despite the concentration of the bond underwriting market, less than 10 major underwriters are enough to ensure perfect competition, then competitive forces will leave the entire benefits of net yield savings to the issuing clients. This argument suggests that underwriting fees and net yield savings are uncorrelated. Furthermore, with the entry of commercial banks, the additional competitive pressure may force incumbent investment banks to reduce fees to retain the clients that they can serve well. In this case, underwriting fees and niche reputation are negatively correlated. This is tested as the competitive pressure hypothesis.
Similarly, in order to attract new customers that commercial banks can serve well, commercial banks may lower the fees to compensate clients' switching costs from investment bank underwriting. In other words, if banks choose to enter the segments that they exhibit a greater differentiated underwriting ability and they promote the clients' incentive to switch to commercial bank underwriting by lowering fees, then fees and net yield differentials will be negatively correlated.
If bank entry is not homogeneous across industries, then investment banks can react to the tightened competition selectively by reducing the fees in the industries with higher levels of bank entry. A significant negative relation between investment bank underwriting fees and the level of bank penetration in the industry indicates that investment banks lower fees strategically, rather than universally, according to the intensity of competition from commercial banks. This is tested as a part of the competitive pressure hypothesis.
Controls for client bargaining power, bank market power, and lending relationship
Underwriters with better reputation or higher market power over clients may tend to charge higher fees. On the other hand, if clients are frequent issuers they tend to have more bargaining power on the fees they pay. Client and underwriter bond issue shares in the industry are employed as the client's bargaining power and the underwriter's quantity reputation, respectively. The underwriter quantity reputation metric is similar to those in Livingston and Miller (2000) . 9 However, instead of calculating an overall market share of an underwriter like prior studies, this paper uses the yearly total issue share of an underwriter in an industry as a proxy for the underwriter's quantity reputation at the industry level. The underwriter issue share is defined as the yearly total number of bonds underwritten by an underwriter divided by the yearly total number of issues in the same industry. The client's issue share is constructed in a similar manner. Alternatively, one can use dollar share instead of issue share. However, the main findings remain robust. As control variables, both measures serve the same purpose.
If the additional lending arm also provides banks more leverage over their clients as contended by Rajan (1992) , then banks will charge higher fees for their underwriting services than investment banks when they possess higher market shares. The impact of lending relationships with commercial bank underwriters on underwriting fees is complicated by many factors. 10 On the one hand, using combined lending and underwriting services reduces information production cost, which leads to lower fees. On the other hand, the potential for conflicts of interest of integrated financial services is a drawback for effective certification, which may increase the effort and cost of underwriting, thus leading to higher fees. Besides, clients that also borrow from commercial bank underwriters may pay higher fees because of banks' monopoly power on these universal banking clients. Table 1 lists variables defined in this section and others discussed in the following section.
3.
Data and Variables
The sample obtained from U.S. New Issues database of SDC Platinum (Thomson Financial Security Data) contains 5834 nonfinancial (excluding issues with 2-digit SIC codes from 60 to 69), nonutility (excluding issues with 2-digit SIC code of 49) and nonconvertible fixed-rate corporate bond issues. The sample period is from 1991 to 2000. However, among these 5834 bond issues, only 3279 have fees and other characteristics available for multivariate analysis. Issue and firm characteristics are from SDC Platinum and COMPUSTAT databases, respectively. The market value of the issuer is collected from the CRSP daily return database.
Firm variables are measured at the end of year prior to the bond offerings.
Bank loans usage (existing lending relationships) are collected from the DealScan database of Loan Pricing Corporation. The amounts of loan deals are aggregated for each bond issue if issuing date is between loan origination date and loan maturity date. Total loans measure the overall bank lending relationships. The certification of banks can reduce the underwriting cost in general, which may reduce the fees charged by underwriters. Underwriter loans measure specific lending relationships with commercial banks that also underwrite for the clients, the amounts are pro-rata based on lender share or loan syndicate size where lender share information is not available. Because the exact payback schedule is not available, compared to the true loan amounts clients actually have, the loan amounts tend to be inflated. However, for the purpose of measuring lending relationships and loan usage intensity, these variables are appropriate.
The corporate bond underwriting market is segmented into 58 industries classified by 2-digit SIC codes based on the information from SDC platinum. The total number of issues by industry, and the number and percentage of issues by commercial banks are reported in Table 2 .
The numbers of issues underwritten in different industries vary. The percentages of commercial bank underwritten issues range from 0 to 100. The large variation indicates that commercial banks do not enter the underwriting market homogenously across segments.
Measure of bank entry
Two variables are used to measure the level of bank entry. Commercial bank issue share in the industry is used for univariate analysis. It is defined as the total number of all commercial bank underwritten bonds each year divided by the total number of issues in the same industry.
Another measure of bank entry is the natural logarithm of one plus total number of issues underwritten by all commercial banks each year in their clients' industries. This specification is used in the underwriting fees regressions because banks can choose to penetrate an industry with a high level of bond underwriting activity. In this case, the percentage measure will be low.
However, it may still pose a significant competitive effect in the industry that causes incumbent investment banks to lower their fees. In addition, this measure is less collinear with clients' and individual underwriters' issue shares, thus, provides more stable estimates.
Underwriting fees and other control variables
Underwriting fees (gross spread in SDC Platinum) are measured as the difference between the offered amounts and the proceeds to the issuer, which includes a management fee, an underwriting fee, and a selling concession. It is expressed as dollars per $1000 of bond issue.
Aggregate issue amounts in the industry is employed to control for the possibility that industries with more active bond underwriting could be more cost efficient for underwriters to conduct business thus they tend to charge lower fees in these industries. Besides, if commercial banks tend to enter segments with more bond issuances, then this variable can control for the effect of lower fees charged by commercial banks due to the entry into lower fees industries.
Because the underwriter-client relationships are continuing, the study controls for prior security issuances and prior underwriter usages. During the later bank entry period, there are many mergers between commercial bank and investment bank underwriters (Song and Goldberg (2003)). Therefore, a hybrid merger dummy is included to control for mergers. Besides, there are increasing numbers of co-led hybrid syndicates between commercial banks and investment banks during this period. A hybrid syndicate dummy is employed to control for syndicate types.
The study of bond underwriting market is very challenging during the decade of 1990s. The extensive controls are motivated by attempting to ensure the results of interest are not driven by other factors that may take more than one paper to study. 
Descriptive Statistics
Issue and firm characteristics
Compared to commercial banks, investment banks charge significantly higher fees and they obtain lower bond net yields in median as shown in Table 3 . Using the 10-year full sample, the estimated net yield savings (bond price differentials representing niche reputation) are significantly positive for both commercial and investment bank underwriters. On average, the savings of investment bank clients appear to be smaller than those of commercial bank clients.
However, commercial bank clients' net yield savings decline over time, while those of investment bank clients increase (See Panel A, Table 9 in Song (2003a)). The pattern indicates that commercial banks choose to enter the segments with the highest net yield savings, i.e., the segments best served by commercial banks.
The median investment bank client is larger in firm size and in bond issue size than the median commercial bank client. Investment bank clients issue bonds with longer maturity. The mean investment bank client borrows more bank loans. Among the clients that have issued bonds during the 5-year period prior to the current bond issuance, the mean commercial bank client issues bonds more frequently but the aggregated issue amounts are smaller. Commercial bank clients also issue equity more often but there is no difference in the aggregated dollar amounts between clients using different types of underwriters. Table 4 shows that commercial bank clients issue bonds more frequently on a yearly basis and have higher bond issuing shares in their industries than investment bank clients. The opposite is true for their underwriters. As incumbents, investment bank underwriters float more bonds and have higher issue shares in their clients' industries than commercial bank underwriters.
Bond underwriting intensity and bank penetration at the industry level
The results indicate that commercial banks are less reputable in the clients' industries but they serve clients with more frequent bond issuances. These active issuers tend to switch back and forth between different types of underwriters. Investment banks appear to serve both active bond issuers and infrequent bond issuers.
The level of bank penetration is higher in commercial bank clients' industries than that in investment bank clients' industries, which shows that bank entry is not homogeneous across industry segments. However, there are no differences in total number and amounts of issues in clients' industries between these two types of underwriters. The levels of bank penetration at the industry level each year are reported in Table 5 . In general, the levels of bank penetration increase over time with clear regime changes surrounding 1996 when the revenue limitation was lifted to 25%. Table 6 , shows that underwriting fees are significantly higher in industries without bank entry than those with bank entry. In general, the fees charged in high bank entry industries (30% or higher) are lower than those in low bank entry industries. The difference in fees between bank entry levels (4) and (5), i.e. within the high bank entry industries, is only significant in median.
Summary statistics of underwriting fees
Similar pattern exhibits among the low bank entry industries (levels 1, 2, and 3). Panel B, Table   6 , compares the fees charged by investment banks to those by commercial banks at different bank penetration levels. There are no differences with only one exception. Investment banks charge higher median fees than do commercial banks in the industries where the bank entry is greater than or equal to 30% but less than 40%. led by both commercial and investment banks, or used the same lead underwriter served in prior debt issuance. The fees are higher for bonds issued to repay bank debt, for new issues, for noninvestment grade bonds, or for bonds underwritten by the same lead underwriter served in prior equity issuance. The fees dropped significantly from 9.7 to 7.1 in mean when the revenue limitations imposed only on commercial banks are raised from 10 percent to 25 percent.
Underwriters engaged in hybrid mergers charge higher fees in mean. Clients with six or more underwriter relationships pay lower fees.
Panel B, Table 7 , indicates that investment banks charge higher fees than commercial banks in general and most of the differences are significant. The only exception is non-shelfregistered issues. However, the numbers are not significantly different between commercial banks and investment banks. The results are consistent with the role of investment banks as incumbents and that of commercial banks as entrants.
5.
Pricing of Underwriting Services
As indicated by the previous section, the revenue limitation increase in 1996 triggers behavioral changes of underwriters. Therefore, this study analyzes the pricing schemes of different underwriters in subperiods to investigate how underwriters price their services in response to the changing market conditions.
5.1.
Fee schedules during the 10 percent revenue limitation period (1991-1996) [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] On the other hand, commercial banks provide fee discounts for their niche reputation.
The significant estimate of -0.07 indicates that commercial banks reduce fees by $2.88 per $1000 of bond issue given the average net yield savings of 41.1 basis points. Relative to median fees ($6.5), it means 44 percent of fee discounts. Given the commodity nature of bond underwriting in contrast to equity underwriting, such fee discounts are substantial. This implies that the bond underwriting market is quite tough to penetrate without providing significant benefits to clients.
Both underwriters' pricing schedules are insensitive to the level of bank penetration.
They both reduce fees for the clients that issue more frequently but the estimate for commercial banks is only marginally significant. The findings are consistent with the claim that banks posses higher market power. The argument is further supported by the significantly positive estimate on underwriter loans, which suggests that commercial banks charge higher fees for clients who also borrow from them. Commercial banks also demonstrate worse distribution ability because the estimate on issue size is almost doubled compared to that of investment banks.
The higher fees charged by commercial banks on issue size implies higher costs of distributing bond issues.
Fee schedules following the 25 percent revenue limitation change (1997-2000)
The fee regressions on the key variables of interest during the later bank entry stage in Table 9 appear to be quite different from those in Table 8 , especially for investment banks.
Investment banks no longer charge higher fees for their niche reputation. Instead, they provide discounts by charging lower fees. However, the magnitude is very small, for each basis point, they lower 0.1 cent in fees. Investment banks also lower fees in the industries with a higher level of commercial bank penetration. The estimate of -0.25 on commercial bank penetration in the industry is significant.
Commercial banks continue to provide discounts in the segments where they exhibit a niche reputation. In addition, they lower fees in the segments with high bank entry. For commercial banks, the estimate of -0.75 on bank penetration is triple that of investment banks.
The pricing scheme during 1997-2000 appears to be much more aggressive compared to that during 1991-1996. In the earlier period, commercial banks' underwriting activities are constrained by the 10 percent revenue limitation, which effectively reduced banks' ability to penetrate the markets. The increase of the revenue limitation to 25 percent permits banks to carry out their ambition more properly. Thus, an aggressive pricing scheme follows.
The phenomenon of commercial bank monopoly power still prevails because investment banks provide discounts to frequent bond issuing clients, but commercial banks do not. However, when niche reputation is held constant, the quantity reputation (underwriter issue share in the industry) is not significant for both underwriters. Prior research, such as, Houston and James (1996) also provides empirical evidence on bank monopoly. Finally, during the later period, banks no longer charge significantly higher fees on issue size than do investment banks.
Overall fee schedules (1991-2000)
Table 10 reports the overall fees regressions for the decade of the 1990s. Therefore, the estimates are the averages across two regimes. The focus of attention is on the yearly dummy variables. Compared to the base year of 1991 (the intercept), the estimates on yearly dummies for both underwriters are significantly positive for some years, which indicates that, after controlling for the strategic variables, both underwriters do not lower fees universally over time.
In addition, compared to investment banks, commercial banks are more responsive in pricing based on the variables of interest, which indicates that commercial banks as entrants have to be more cautious and sensitive in pricing underwriting services than incumbent investment banks. Table 11 reports the pooled fees regressions to further compare the pricing strategies of both underwriters as a robustness check. Model (1), Table 11 reports the fees regression for the period of 1991-1996. The estimate on the commercial bank dummy is significantly positive, which indicates that commercial banks actually charge higher base fees, perhaps reflecting higher base production costs. However, they lower fees tremendously on the segments where they serve well. Once again, these findings indicate that, instead of lowering fees universally, banks have to price their services carefully and lower fees based on their strategic maneuvers.
Model (2), Table 11 , reports the pooled fees regression during 1997-2000. The estimate on the commercial bank dummy is insignificant. That on the interaction term between commercial bank dummy and underwriter issue share is also insignificant, which indicates that commercial banks no longer charge higher fees compared to investment banks because of commercial bank monopoly power. The differences in pricing schemes of both underwriters diminish, although commercial banks appear to be more aggressive in lowering the fees.
Conclusions
The gradual erosion of the Glass-Steagall wall between commercial banking and investment banking in the 1990s offers a great opportunity to examine how underwriters with different roles -incumbent investment banks vs. entrant commercial banks -react to the changing market environments. Perhaps the most interesting findings pertain to the behavioral differences in pricing of underwriting services between incumbents and entrants on niche reputations and on the level of bank penetration across different regulatory regimes. The results can shed lights on the industrial organization of the bond underwriting market.
Whether the market is oligopolistic or competitive has important implications on underwriters' incentives to do due diligence. The results show that investment banks charge higher fees for their niche reputation in the early entry period. However, such rents are competed away later when commercial banks are permitted to expand more forcefully. On the other hand, as entrants, commercial banks always provide fees discounts to the clients that they serve well regardless of time period. These findings suggest that the bond underwriting market was indeed difficult to penetrate. Commercial banks have to provide significant benefits, better services and lower fees, to attract new customers.
Bank entry did provide a shock to the bond underwriting market. The market appeared to move away from its oligopolistic market structure and became competitive in the 1990s. If the prediction by Anand and Galetovic (2000) is correct -an oligopolistic market is necessary for the market to exist -the fees reduction in the late 1990s may indeed distort the incentives of underwriters. Market imperfections give underwriters the role to serve their clients in securities'
issuances. However, for the market to exist and to function properly, the market imperfections require that rents beyond regular production costs are earned by underwriters, so they have enough incentive to maintain reputation capital. This suggests that the more competitive market structure in the late 1990s is unlikely to prevail, which is at odds with the market imperfections permanently inherent in the system. This paper, together with others, such as Song (2004), provide some empirical evidence to demonstrate that bank entry competitive pressure may contribute to the observed questionable investment banking practices. The evaluation of bank entry effect on a broader scale has been ignored in the prior empirical studies on bank underwriting that emphasize only on the welfare of issuing clients. If the industry has gone through a major structural change, the narrower comparison between commercial banks and investment banks is unlikely to capture the important industry-wide effect because both types of underwriters can be bad simultaneously when the overall underwriting incentive has switched to a lower regime. On the contrary, the study on important economic fundamentals, such as overall market structures and rents for reputation, can shed light on this issue. The broader view to directly evaluate the impact of bank entry is indispensable because the securities industry plays a critical role in capital allocation in an economy. By the same token, more studies are needed to better understand the evolution of the securities industry during the Internet bubble period and the subsequent efforts by various market participants to restore the confidence and integrity in the financial system.
In this appendix, I illustrate the potential endogeneity problem arising in the underwriting fees regression when the net yield savings between different underwritings is an explanatory variable.
Consider the following model:
spread = δ 0 + x 2 δ 1 + δ 2 z + δ 3 (net yield savings) + e (2) where yield is the net yield of a bond issue, spread is the underwriting fees charged by an underwriter, x 1 and x 2 are vectors of measurable explanatory variables, such as firm size, credit ratings, etc., z is an un-measurable explanatory variable that indicates the quality of firm, or a firm characteristic variable omitted in the Compustat data collection, therefore, we have an omitted variable problem in the regression analysis. Net yield savings are the incremental interest cost savings of using selected underwriting versus the unselected one. It is defined as the difference between expected conditional mean net yield of bond issue using unselected underwriting service (E(yield u )) minus the observed net yield of bond issue (yield). Assume that v and e are random variables with E(v|
, E(x 1 'z) = 0, E(x 2 'z) = 0, E(x 1 'x 2 ) = 0. Equation (2) could be rewritten as the following:
The consistent OLS estimator requires that the covariance between yield and z equals to zero.
However, from equation (1) COV ( 
Variable name Definition
Pricing of underwriting services
Underwriting fees Dollar charged per $1000 of bond issue including a management fee, an underwriting fee, and a selling concession.
Interest costs paid by issuers (Pricing of bonds)
Net yield (basis point spread)
The premium of the ex ante yield spread of a bond over the ex ante yield of a U.S. Treasury security of similar maturity.
Measure of differentiated underwriting ability, i.e., niche reputation in serving a certain clientele
Predicted net yield savings
The predicted bond net yield had the issuing firm using the unselected underwriting service minus the predicted bond net yield of using the selected underwriting service. It measures the predicted incremental interest cost savings of using selected underwriter versus the unselected one.
Commercial bank underwriting intensity in industry Bank penetration in industry
Ln(1+yearly number of all commercial bank underwritten bonds in the bond issuing firm's industry classified by a 2-digit SIC code)
Client's bargaining power with its underwriter
Client issue share in industry
Yearly number of bonds issued by the client firm divided by the total yearly number of issues in the same industry classified by a 2-digit SIC code.
Underwriter's reputation at the industry level
Underwriter issue share in industry
Yearly number of bonds underwritten by the underwriter divided by the total yearly number of issues in the same industry classified by a 2-digit SIC code. Ln(1+loans from a commercial bank that also underwrites for the client in $MM) Commercial bank underwriter loans are pro-rata based on lender share or loan syndicate size where lender share information is not available. 
Variable name Definition
Control for macroeconomic conditions T-bill rate (3-month)
Monthly 3-month T-bill rate in %
Control for macroeconomic conditions
Slope of the yield curve
The rate of a 10-year U.S. Treasury security minus that of a 1-year U.S. Treasury security in %
Credit spread (BBB-AAA)
Credit spreads between BBB and AAA rated bonds in % No. of observations 1615 178 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. No. of observations 2685 594 ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively, for a two-tailed test. 
